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Stock Redemptions and the Family-Owned
Corporation: Tax Traps on the Path to Capital
Gain Treatment
Scott

E. Copple*

The recent enactment of the new capital gains exclusion1 has
raised the stakes in planning for the redemption of corporate
stock. This article discusses the tax problems confronting a
shareholder in a family-owned corporation when the
shareholder enters into an agreement for the redemption of his
or her stock.

In a transaction involving the redemption of corporate
stock, whether a shareholder is treated as the recipient of a
dividend distribution or the seller of stock has important
federal income tax ramifications. If the redemption is treated
as a dividend, the distribution to the shareholder is taxed as
ordinary income. On the other hand, if the redemption is
treated as a sale, the shareholder recognizes a capital gain
based on the excess of the amount of the distribution over the
basis in the stock redeemed. Assuming a taxpayer receives a
distribution of $1,000,000 in exchange for his or her stock, the
taxpayer could pay an additional $256,000 in federal income
tax if the transaction is treated as a dividend di~tribution.~

* Assistant Professor of Accountancy, College of Business Administration,
University of Nebraska a t Omaha. J.D., College of William and Mary's MarshallWythe School of Law; LL.M., Denver University College of Law; C.P.A. (inactive).
The author was employed as a tax manager by Grant Thornton, CPAs, primarily
in the areas of tax planning and I.R.S. appeals. He currently teaches
undergraduate and graduate tax courses a t the University of Nebraska a t Omaha.
1. I.R.C. $ 1202 (1988).
2. A shareholder in the 39.6% marginal tax bracket would pay $396,000 in
federal income tax on the distribution if it were taxed as a dividend. See id.
$ l(a). Assuming the redemption were treated as a sale and that the gain qualified
for the partial exclusion under I.R.C. 9 1202, only $500,000 of the gain (assuming
no basis in the stock) would be taxed a t a rate of 28%, resulting in a federal
income tax liability of $140,000 on the redemption. See id. $0 l(h), 1202. The
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The adverse tax consequences associated with a failed
stock redemption require careful planning on the part of a
shareholder in a family-owned corporation. A shareholder in a
family-owned corporation may confront several problems in
achieving capital gain treatment on the redemption of his or
her stock. For example, if the corporation's stock is held in
trust for the benefit of family members, the redemption may be
recast as a dividend distribution. In addition, a shareholder
who provides postredemption services to the corporation may
jeopardize the sale treatment that would otherwise characterize
the transaction. Finally, if the redeemed shareholder, in an
effort to accommodate the corporation's need for additional
financing, allows an installment note received in the
redemption to be subordinated to the claims of other corporate
creditors, the Internal Revenue Service ("the Service") may
attempt to recast the sale as a dividend distribution.
This paper examines case law and administrative
interpretations in an effort to demonstrate the extent to which
a shareholder may, through proper tax planning, avoid these
problems. I n addition, whether these judicial and
administrative interpretations support the policies underlying
the rules surrounding stock redemptions in the case of familyowned corporations is examined.

The tax consequences to a shareholder receiving a
nonliquidating distribution from his or her subchapter C
corporation are governed primarily by $8 301 and 302.~Under
8 301, a shareholder recognizes ordinary income upon the
receipt of a distribution from his or her corporation to the
extent of the shareholder's share of the corporation's earnings
and profits.* On the other hand, if a shareholder's stock is
redeemed by the corporation and the transaction meets the
requirements found in 5 302, the distribution by the
corporation is treated as an amount realized on the sale of
The shareholder recognizes capital
stock by the ~hareholder.~

characterization of redistribution as a dividend would almost certainly result in an
even larger tax differential since the shareholder's gain would be reduced by the
tax basis in the stock redeemed.
3. Id. $0 301, 302.
4. See id. §§ 301(c), 316(a).
5. Id. $ 302(a).
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gain or loss based on the difference between the amount
realized and the adjusted basis of the stock redeemed?
Prior to the enactment of $ 302, the courts determined the
tax consequences of a corporate redemption by examining the
facts and circumstances surrounding the distribution.' If the
facts and circumstances indicated a distribution was essentially
equivalent to a dividend, the shareholder was treated as
though a dividend distribution had been made, even though the
shareholder actually surrendered stock to the ~orporation.~
In enacting 5 302, Congress sought to provide certainty so
that shareholders in closely held corporations would know the
tax treatment for a distribution pursuant to a proposed
redemption transa~tion.~
Although the "dividend equivalence"
test of prior law found its way into $ 302," three mechanical
tests were also enacted to provide the certainty Congress
intended for shareholders planning stock redemption
transactions." Two of the mechanical tests found in $ 302
deal with determining the degree of change in the shareholder's
ownership in the redeeming corporation. Under 5 302(b)(2), a
shareholder will receive sale treatment for a redemption
transaction, if after the redemption the shareholder owns less
than 50% of the voting power of the corporation and if his
percentage ownership in the outstanding voting stock (as well
as all common stock) is reduced by more than 20%.12 Such a
redemption is referred to as a "substantially disproportionate
redemption."13 Under 5 302(b)(3), a shareholder will receive
sale treatment if all the stock owned by the shareholder is
redeemed by the corporation." Such a redemption is referred
to as a "complete redemption."15

-

-

-

6. Id. $ 1001(a).
7 . See, e.g., Bains v. United States, 289 F.2d 644, 646 (Ct. C1. 1961).
8. Id. at 647.
9. H.R. REP. NO. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4019, 4060-61; S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4623, 4675.
10. I.R.C. $ 302(b)(l).
11. Id. $ 302(b)(2)-(4).
12. Id. $ 302(b)(2).
13. Id.
14. Id. $ 302(b)(3). The third mechanical test deals with a redemption of
stock pursuant to a partial liquidation of the corporation and is not relevant to the
issues addressed in this paper. See id. $ 302(b)(4).
15. Id.
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The stock attribution rules of $ 318 are made applicable to
redemption transactions of 8 302.16 Without the application of
these stock attribution rules, a shareholder seeking to receive a
distribution from his or her corporation could transfer stock to
a related party, such as a spouse or a wholly owned
corporation, and after the transfer enter into a redemption
transaction meeting the requirements of $ 302(b)(2) or (b)(3).
Under the stock attribution rules of 5 318, a shareholder is
treated as the owner of stock actually owned by certain related
parties for purposes of determining if there has been, in
substance as well as in form, a substantially disproportionate
distribution or a complete redemption.17
In general, for purposes of the redemption tests in 5 302,
the family stock attribution rules applicable to stock
redemptions provide that stock owned by certain family
members is attributed to the shareholder whose stock is
redeemed? Application of the family attribution rules makes
it extremely difficult for a shareholder in a family-owned
corporation to receive sale treatment on a redemption of stock.
After the redemption, the shareholder is treated as owning any
stock held by family members. Even bona fide redemptions
flunk the tests of 5 302 since all stock owned by family
members after the redemption are treated as the shareholder's
stock, thus precluding a substantially disproportionate
distribution and a complete redemption.
Congress intended to allow a family member engaging in a
bona fide stock redemption to receive capital gain treatment.lg
Consequently, 8 302(c)(2) provides an exception to the
application of the family stock attribution rules.20A taxpayer

16.
17.
18.
19.
a t 4061;
4676.
20.

Id. 8 302(c)(l).
Id. 8 318.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 1337, supra note 9, a t 36, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
S. REP. NO. 1622, supra note 9, a t 45, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. a t

I.R.C.4 302(c)(2). Section 302(c)(2)(A) provides in part:
(A) In the case of a distribution described in subsection (b)(3), section
318(a)(l) shall not apply if(i) immediately after the distribution the distributee has no interest in
the corporation (including an interest as officer, director, or employee),
other than an interest as a creditor,
(ii) the distributee does not acquire any such interest (other than
stock acquired by bequest or inheritance) within 10 years from the date
of such distribution, and
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who enters into a redemption agreement with his or her familyowned corporation can be assured of sale treatment as long as
all the stock of the corporation held by the taxpayer is
redeemed; there are no related parties, as set forth in 8 318,
other than family members who own stock in the corporation;
and the taxpayer has no interest in the corporation for a tenyear period after the redemption.21It is the application of the
stock attribution rules, and the conditions that must be met in
order to waive the family stock attribution rules, that create
the problems confronting a shareholder of a family-owned
corporation who seeks sale treatment on the redemption of his
or her stock.

A. The Problem with Stock Held in Trust
Stock in a family-owned corporation may be owned by
several family members. In addition, corporate stock may be
held by a testamentary trust as a result of the death of a
shareholder whose assets pass to a marital or nonmarital trust
pursuant to prudent estate planning. In most cases, the testamentary trust provides income to the surviving spouse andlor
younger family members. The trust principal may be distributable to younger family members upon the death of the surviving spouse or the trust may give to the surviving spouse a
power of appointment over the trust p r i n ~ i p a l .In
~ ~addition,
depending on the estate planning objectives of the decedent,
the trustee may be given the power to make discretionary distributions to the surviving spouse or younger family members.
Younger family members may have divergent business
philosophies. Some family members may work for the corporation while others show little interest in the corporation's affairs. Family members may simply not get along. For whatever
reason, one or more shareholders may seek to terminate their

(iii) the distributee, at such time and in such manner as the
Secretary by regulations prescribes, files an agreement to notify the
Secretary of any acquisition described in clause (ii) and to retain such
records as may be necessary for the application of this paragraph.
21. Id. 5 302(c)(2). It is only the family stock attribution rules that can be
waived under I.R.C. 5 302(c)(2).
22. See id. 4 2056(b)(5), (7).
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interest in the corporation and invest their stock redemption
proceeds elsewhere.
The use of trusts to hold stock in a family-owned corporation can create a problem if a family member who is a trust
beneficiary decides to terminate his or her interest in the corporation pursuant to a stock redemption transaction. The redeemed shareholder may be treated as a continuing shareholder due to his or her beneficial interest in the trust, no matter
how remote the beneficial interest.23 This deemed continuing
ownership interest in the redeeming corporation may cause the
redemption to be recast, for federal income tax purposes, as a
dividend distribution.

B. The Application of the Stock Attribution Rules
Originally, some confusion existed over exactly who might
waive the family stock attribution rules in redemption transactions. The Service took the position that only individual taxpayers could waive these rules.24This position prevented a trust
from achieving capital gain treatment on a stock redemption
when its beneficiaries were related to other shareholders in
such a way that the shareholders' interests were attributed to
the trust beneficiaries. For example, if a surviving spouse was
the beneficiary of a testamentary trust, and the trust received
a distribution from the corporation in exchange for all the corporate stock held by the trust, the Service treated the distribution to the trust as a dividend if children of the surviving
spouse also owned stock in the corporation. Fortunately for
taxpayers, the courts did not necessarily agree with the Service.
In Crawford u. Cornrni~sioner,~~
the Tax Court held that a
trust could utilize the 5 302(c)(2)family stock attribution waiver and treat the redemption of all the trust's stock as a complete termination under 5 302(b)(3). Capital gain treatment
was allowed even though the trust beneficiary was related to
other shareholders under the family stock attribution rule of
5 318(a)(l). Other courts held for trusts on facts similar to
~ ~ holding in Crawford was later codithose of C r ~ w f o r d .The

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. 5 318(a)(2)(B).
Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B. 106.
59 T.C. 830 (1973).
See, e.g., Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1979).
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fied in 1982 as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
The waiver of the family stock attribution rule made available to trusts under $ 302(c)(2)(C)allows a trust to treat a redemption of stock as a sale but does not address the problem
an individual taxpayer may face when he or she seeks capital
gain treatment on the redemption of all his or her stock. If the
shareholder is also a beneficiary of a trust, the shareholder will
be deemed to own stock held by the
This deemed stock
ownership will likely cause the redemption to be treated as a
dividend distribution.
To illustrate, suppose a deceased shareholder, under the
terms of his or her will, transfers stock in a family-owned corporation to a trust. The trust provides that income is to be
distributed to the surviving spouse. The trustee is given the
power to make discretionary distributions of trust income or
corpus to the surviving spouse or to the children of the decedent. The surviving spouse is given a special power of appointment over the trust corpus. Absent an exercise of the power of
appointment, upon the death of the surviving spouse the trust
corpus is to be distributed to the three children, A, B, and C, of
the deceased shareholder and the surviving spouse. The re27. Pub. L. No.

97-248, § 228(a), 96 Stat. 324, 493 (1982). I.R.C.

$ 302(c)(2)(C)provides:

(i) In general.-[The waiver of the family stock attribution rule (subparagraph (A))] shall not apply to a distribution to any entity unless(I) such entity and each related person meet the requirements of
clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of subparagraph (A), and
(11) each related person agrees to be jointly and severally liable for
any deficiency (including interest and additions to tax) resulting from an
acquisition described in clause (ii) of subparagraph (A).
In any case to which the preceding sentence applies, the second sentence
of subparagraph (A) and subparagraph (B)(ii) shall be applied by substituting "distributee or any related person" for "distributeen each place it
appears.
(ii) Definitions.-For purposes of this subparagraph(I) the term "entityn means a partnership, estate, trust, or corporation; and
(11) the term "related person" means any person to whom ownership of stock in the corporation is (at the time of the distribution) attributable under section 318(a)(l) if such stock is further attributable to the
entity under section 318(a)(3).
28. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(B). Section 302(c)(2)(C) addresses the waiver of family
attribution when a trust's stock is redeemed, not the waiver of the trust-beneficiary
attribution rules.
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maining stock in the corporation is owned by the surviving
spouse and the three children. The surviving spouse alone,
through direct stock ownership and through the stock attributed to her through her beneficial interest in the trust, owns or is
deemed to own more than 50% of the total outstanding stock.
In addition, suppose that acrimony develops after the
shareholder's death, largely due to the fact that A and B, who
are not active in the affairs of the corporation, distrust C, who
is the corporation's president. To resolve the conflict, the family
proposes that A and B sell their stock to the corporation and
invest the sale proceeds elsewhere.
Unless the redemption qualifies as a complete termination
under 5 302(b)(3), the redeemed shareholders, A and B, must
treat the amounts received as dividend income. Since the redeemed shareholders are treated as owning the surviving
spouse's stock in all cases other than a complete termination,
each would be deemed to own more than 50% of the
corporation's outstanding stock.29 This deemed stock ownership would cause their redemption to fail the disproportionate
distribution test under 5 302(b)(2) and almost certainly the
dividend equivalency test under 8 302(b)(l), which requires a
showing that the distribution was not essentially equivalent to
a dividend.
Assuming each redeemed shareholder makes an election
under 8 302(c)(2)(A)(iii)and files the necessary information
with the Service, however, the stock of the surviving spouse
will not be attributed to them.30Their sibling's, C's, stock will
not be attributed to them either since brothers and sisters are
not considered related parties.31Further, the stock held by the
trust and attributed to the surviving spouse will not be attributed through the surviving spouse to the children since the
family stock attribution waiver applies to the stock attributable
to the spouse through the
However, there is no specific statutory provision preventing the stock held by the trust
from being attributed to the children as trust beneficiaries
under 5 318(a)(2)(B)(i).~~
Will the redeemed shareholder's con29. Id. § 318(a)(l).
30. Id. 5 302(c)(2).
31. Id. 5 318(a)(l).
32. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-12-032 (Dec. 21, 1977).
33. Only the family stock attribution rules are waived under I.R.C.
9 302(c)(2). The other stock attribution rules of 5 318 apply in determining whether
a redeemed shareholder has terminated his or her interest in the corporation un-
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tingent remainder interests therefore cause the redemption to
be treated as a dividend distribution?
The statutory language offers little hope to the redeemed
shareholder. Section 318(a)(2)(B)(i)provides that beneficiaries
of a trust are treated as owning stock held by the trust in an
amount relative to their actuarial interest in the
Section 318(a)(3)(B)(i),which states that stock owned by a trust
beneficiary will be attributed to the trust, also provides that no
attribution to the trust is made if the beneficiary holds only a
remote, contingent interest i n the
Section
318(a)(2)(B)(i)does not provide a similar exclusion for remote,
contingent interests in the case of trust-to-beneficiary attribution. No court decisions have dealt specifically with the question of whether a de minimis rule similar to that found in
8 318(a)(3)(B)(i)should be read into § 318(a)(2)(B)(i).Treasury
regulations do not address the issue either. However, the Service has addressed the issue, albeit not in the context of a stock
redemption. Revenue Procedure 77-37,36which sets forth operating rules relating to the issuance of letter rulings, provides
guidelines for taxpayers requesting a ruling regarding corporate reorganizations. Section 3.05 of Revenue Procedure 77-37
states:
In determining stock ownership to be attributed to a
trust or from a trust under the rules of sections 318(a)(2)(B)(i)
and 313(a)(3)(B)(i)of the Code in those cases where a surviving spouse is entitled to all the income for life from the trust
and also holds a power of appointment over the corpus of the
trust, and in default of the exercise of the power the property
held by the trust is to pass to the children of the surviving
spouse, attribution will be -computed as if the surviving
spouse has exercised the power in favor of his or her children,
so that they will be considered beneficiaries in the absence of
evidence that the power has been differently exercised.

der 6 302(b)(3). See supra note 21.
34. I.R.C. 6 318(a)(2)(B)(ii)provides that stock held by a trust will be attributed to a taxpayer who is considered the owner of the trust under the grantor
trust rules in I.R.C. $0 671-679 (1988). Therefore, if the surviving spouse is given
a general power of appointment over the trust corpus, and is treated as the owner
of the trust property under I.R.C. 6 678, then the stock held by the trust would be
treated as owned by the surviving spouse and the waiver of the family attribution
rules would apply to the stock held by the trust. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-35-038
(June 1, 1990).
35. I.R.C. 6 318(a)(3)(B)(i).
36. 1977-2 C.B. 568.
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It appears, from section 3.05, that the Service will treat a
contingent trust beneficiary as the owner of his or her proportionate share of the stock held by the trust. Without a relaxation of the application of the trust-to-beneficiary stock attribution rule, even a remote, contingent remainderman will not be
able to treat the redemption of his or her stock as a complete
termination. A and B in the example set forth above would
thus be required to treat the amount received for their stock as
dividend distributions.
This is a harsh result for the redeeming shareholder. As a
remote, contingent remainderman of the trust, the shareholder
has no control over the stock held in trust. If another (the surviving spouse in the example set forth above) has a power of
appointment over the trust property, the shareholder may
never receive his or her remainder interest. As a practical matter, such a shareholder has no more an interest in the stock
held in trust than the same shareholder has in stock held outright by a related party whose will provides for the transfer of
such stock to the shareholder.
The position taken in Revenue Procedure 77-37 is particularly harsh when one considers that after a complete redemption of a shareholder's stock, the shareholder is allowed to
inherit stock from a decedent without affecting the characterization of the prior distribution as a redemption transa~tion.~?
That same shareholder would be denied sale treatment if, prior
to the related shareholder's death, the related shareholder held
a special power of appointment over stock held in trust and if a
redeeming shareholder possessed at the time of the stock redemption only a remote, contingent interest in the trust. Congress should consider amending § 318(a)(2)(B)(i),at least as it
applies to stock redemptions, to include a de minimis rule similar to the rule provided in 5 318(a)(3)(B)(i)to prevent stock
attribution to remote, contingent beneficiaries.

C. Possible Solutions to the Problem
Absent congressional action, a shareholder could renounce
his or her interest in the trust and thereby avoid the trust to
beneficiary stock attribution rule.38 However, this may be a n
impractical and expensive alternative. First, the shareholder

37. I.R.C. 9 302(c)(2)(B).
38. Rev. Rul. 71-211, 1971-1 C.B. 112.
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may be treated as making a gift subject to federal gift tax upon
ren~nciation.~'
Second, the taxpayer may be denied the opportunity to share in the estate of his or her parents, since the
trust assets will ultimately be distributed to the remaining
trust beneficiaries. Finally, the renouncing shareholderheneficiary may see trust property go to the very family
member who is the cause of his or her desire to enter into the
stock redemption agreement in the first place. He or she may
be forced to remain a disgruntled shareholder to avoid such a
distasteful result.
The trust to beneficiary attribution rule could also be
avoided if the surviving spouse exercised his or her power of
appointment and directed the trust to make a distribution to
the redeeming shareholder in an amount equal to the intended
disposition of the trust property upon the death of the surviving spouse. The redeemed shareholder could then renounce his
or her interest in the trust, having received his or her "share"
of trust property, and thereby attain sale treatment on the
redemption. However, the surviving spouse may be unwilling to
authorize such a distribution due to concern over the loss of
control over the property to be distributed. The surviving
spouse may be reluctant to do anything that might alter the
intent of the deceased spouse regarding when and to whom his
or her assets should ultimately be distributed.
Perhaps the most palatable solution to the problem caused
by the trust-to-beneficiary stock attribution rule would be to
distribute the stock held by the trust to the surviving spouse.
Such a distribution would not create adverse tax consequences
for the surviving spouse or the trust and would result in stock
being held only by family members. In the example set forth
above the trustee could exercise his or her power to distribute
the stock from the trust to the surviving spouse. Additionally,
the surviving spouse could transfer all the stock received to a
newly created trust in which A and B had no interest. A and B
would receive sale treatment on the redemption since the family stock attribution waiver provision would allow the redemption to qualify as a complete termination under 5 302(b)(3).
This solution presupposes the ability to transfer the stock
held in trust to trust beneficiaries. The power to transfer may
be held by the surviving spouse as a power of appointment over
--

-

39. I.R.C.

5

2503.
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the trust property or by the trustee as a power to distribute
trust property to trust beneficiaries. The power need not be
plenary. The terms of the trust may give the surviving spouse
the right to income only and prevent the trustee from making
discretionary distributions of trust property. Without the power
to distribute the stock held by the trust, the redeeming shareholder will face the hard choice between renouncing his or her
interest in the trust and risking dividend treatment on the
redemption transaction.

D. Summary
Closely held business owners and their tax advisors should
exercise caution in planning for the disposition of stock in a
family-owned corporation. Placing the stock of a family-owned
corporation in trust is a dangerous proposition when no provision is made for the distribution of such stock. Family hostility
may erupt after the death of the first spouse and could cause
the corporation to suffer, as feuding shareholders, unwilling to
renounce and incur distribution tax treatment, fail to focus on
the operation of the corporation's business.

IV. POST-REDEMPTION
SERVICES
PROVIDED
BY THE REDEEMED
SHAREHOLDER
The retiring shareholder of a closely held corporation may
have a particular expertise that was gained through formal
education or through years of experience in the corporation's
business. Perhaps the retiring shareholder holds a professional
degree in accounting or law and has developed a special expertise in some aspect of his or her profession relating to the business of the corporation. Or perhaps the retiring shareholder is
an engineer with a special expertise related to the products
developed and sold by the corporation.
Younger family members may want to retain the retiring
shareholder for the expertise he or she has developed. To that
end the corporation and the redeemed shareholder may enter
into an employment or consulting contract, or the corporation
may engage the redeemed shareholder from time to time after
the redemption to provide consulting services to the corporas
tion. Will such an agreement for postredemption s e ~ c e be
considered a prohibited "interest" in the corporation under
5 302(c)(2)(A)and therefore cause the family attribution rules
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to apply in determining whether the taxpayer was completely
redeemed?

A. Analysis of Primary Authority
the taxpayer received a disIn Lewis v. Cornmis~ioner,'~
tribution from his family-owned corporation in exchange for all
his stock in the corporation. The taxpayer, who formed the
corporation to operate his retail automobile dealership, initially
owned all the stock but had transferred stock to his sons over a
period of years so that at the date of redemption he owned 495
of the 1,000 shares ~utstanding.~'
Although the taxpayer did
not work for the corporation after the redemption, he did hold
the title of vice president and was an inactive member of the
board of dire~tors.'~
The Tax Court majority held that the redemption transaction was not essentially equivalent to a dividend and therefore
qualified for sale or exchange treatment under 5 302(b)(1).'~
One might question the holding of the Tax Court given the f a d
that had the stock attribution rules been applied, the taxpayer
would have been treated as owning 100% of the corporation's
stock." However, the significance of Lewis is not in its holding
but rather in its concurring opinion, which discusses application of the waiver of the family attribution rules provided by
5 302(c)(2) to the facts of the case.45
The concurring opinion concluded that the taxpayer met
the requirements of $ 302(c)(2), including the prohibition
against having a prohibited interest in the corporation, despite
the fact that the taxpayer held the positions of vice president
and member of the board of directors:
The purpose of section 302(c)(2)is to provide that when there
is a bona fide severance of the shareholder's interest, he will
receive capital gains treatment. On the other hand, although
there is no direct judicial authority or statement in the legislative history of section 302(c)(2), I believe that Congress did
not intend us to hold that an officer or director who performs
no duties, receives no compensation, and exercises no influ-

47 T.C. 129 (1966).
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 135.
44. See id.; I.R.C. 8 318.
45. 47 T.C. at 136 (Simpson, J., concurring).
40.
41.
42.
43.
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ence has retained an interest in the corporation. It is a fair
inference from the section as a whole and from its legislative
history that Congress was concerned with the situation in
which there was a nominal transfer of stock in a family corporation, although the transferor continued to control the corporation and benefit by its operations. . . . Finally, I believe
that form should not be placed above substance, that in substance this petitioner did not retain an interest in the corporation, and that accordingly he has met the condition of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i).*~

In short, the concurrence concluded that the parenthetical
language in 5 302(c)(2)(A)(i)does not prohibit every officer or
director from waiving the family attribution rules. While a
retained interest may include an interest as an officer or director, every officer or director does not necessarily hold an
.~~
an officer or director reinterest in the c ~ r p o r a t i o nWhether
tains an interest in the corporation should be determined by
examining the substance, rather than the form, of the relationship between the redeemed shareholder and the redeeming
corp~ration.~~
The Tax Court first addressed the issue of whether a consulting agreement constitutes an interest in the corporation
In
under 5 302(c)(2)(A)(i) in Lennard v. Cornrnis~ioner.~~
Lennard, the taxpayer's one-third interest in a corporation
originally formed by his son and an unrelated third party was
redeemed, and the taxpayer simultaneously resigned his positions as director and secretary-trea~urer.~'The taxpayer, a
C.P.A., continued to perform accounting services for the corporation, for which he was compensated as an independent contractor.51 There was no continuing consulting contract between the corporation and the taxpayer. After the redemption,
and a subsequent stock acquisition, the taxpayer's son owned
two-thirds of the stock in the corporation.
The Service argued that due to the consulting services
performed for the corporation, the taxpayer had an interest in
the corporation after the stock redemption and sought to char-

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 137-38 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
61 T.C.554 (1974).
Id. at 555, 557.
Id. at 557.
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acterize the amount received from the corporation as a dividend.52The Service cited Revenue Ruling 7 0 - 1 0 4 ~in~ support
of its position.54In Revenue Ruling 70-104, a father, who with
his children owned a corporation engaged in the retail jewelry
business, entered into an agreement with the corporation for
the redemption of all his stock. In addition, the corporation and
the father entered into a five-year consulting agreement by
which the father would provide consulting services to the corporation.55 The Service held that the consulting agreement constituted an "interest in the corporation" under § 302(c)(2)(A)(i)
so that the waiver of the family stock attribution rules was not
available to the father? His stock redemption was therefore
treated as a dividend.57
The Tax Court rejected the argument made by the Service.
While recognizing that the revenue ruling represented the
position of the Service, the court distinguished the facts of the
case from the facts presented in the ruling:
Even if the revenue ruling were controlling, which it is
not, we think the facts of this case are different. [The taxpayer] performed monthly accounting services for the corporation
as a certified public accountant and member of an independent accounting partnership. The services were of a prescribed nature and were far more circumscribed than the
broader consultant and advisory services rendered by the
taxpayer in the revenue ruling. There was no employment
contract involved here so that the relationship between [the
corporation] and the accounting firm could have been terminated at any time. Moreover, we do not have here a father
who is attempting to transfer his business to his son and
continue to retain control of its operation. Rather, we have a
situation where a son has established a successfit1 business
with the financial cooperation of his father, and the father is
in a position to provide services to the corporation in an independent capacity afier his stock ownership and interest therein have been severed.58

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 560.
1970-1 C.B. 66.
Lennard, 61 T.C. at 560.
Rev. Rul. 70-104, 1970-1 C.B. 66.
Id.
Id.
Lennard, 61 T.C. at 560-61.
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Citing Lewis, the Tax Court reasoned that Congress did
not intend to include an independent contractor with no financial stake in the corporation as one possessing an interest in
the corporation for purposes of the attribution waiver rules?'
According to the Tax Court, in enacting 5 302(c)(2), Congress
was primarily concerned with redemption transactions in which
the redeemed shareholder retained a financial stake in the
corporation or continued to control and benefit from the
corporation's operations following the redemption. The Tax
Court concluded that:
It is apparent that by the use of the word "interest" [in
5 302(c)(Z)(A)(i)], Congress had in mind a corporate involvement greater than that attributable to a third party
providing goods or services to the corporation. In fad, the
statute specifically excludes creditor interests from those
prohibited by the attribution waiver rules contained in section
302(c),6O

The Tax Court found that the services performed by the
taxpayer were no more substantial than those that might have
been performed by any ac~ountant.~'
The taxpayer had no influence over the operations of the corporation and the fees
received by the taxpayer did not amount to a financial stake in
the corporation.62 The court therefore characterized the
taxpayer's interest in the corporation as no greater than a
creditor's interest.63
Other Tax Court cases have similarly dealt with a redeemed shareholder's continuing interest in the redeeming
corporation. In these cases, the taxpayer's continuing status as
an employee, rather than an independent contractor, has generally been the critical fact that has caused the court to apply
the family attribution rules and characterize the redemption
transaction as a dividend.64However, two circuit court cases
have also dealt with the issue presented in Lennard, with
mixed results.

59. Id. at 561.
60. Id. at 561-62.
61. Id. at 562.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Seda v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 484, 488 (1984); Cerone v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1, 33 (1986).
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In Chertkof v. Commi~sioner,6~
the taxpayer and his father owned all the stock in a corporation (E & T Realty Company) which constructed, owned, and leased a shopping center?
The taxpayer's one-third interest in the corporation was redeemed in exchange for a one-third interest in the shopping
center.67Less than one year after the redemption the corporation entered into a management agreement with the taxpayer
and a new management corporation (Chertkof Co.) owned by
the taxpayer.68 The agreement, which was not terminable for
two years, gave the taxpayer's corporation the exclusive power
to determine rents, negotiate and execute leases, and set aside
The fee charged by the
money for repairs and insuran~e.~'
taxpayer's corporation was below customary rates for similar
management contracts.70
The Service challenged the taxpayer's treatment of the
redemption transaction. The Tax Court upheld the Service's
position that through the management agreement the taxpayer
acquired an interest in the corporation within the meaning of
$ 302(~)(2)(A)(ii).?'
Because the Tax Court concluded that the
taxpayer could not waive the family attribution rules, the stock
held by the taxpayer's father was attributed to the taxpayer
and the redemption proceeds were treated as a dividend.72
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the
decision of the Tax
The Fourth Circuit agreed with
the Tax Court that the management contract should properly
be treated as between the taxpayer and the redeeming corporation:
It is true that Chertkof Co. is a bona fide corporation. Its
essential purpose, however, is engineering; it had never before
managed property or engaged in the kind of commercial activity required by the maintenance contract. Taxpayer, on the
other hand, was experienced in commercial property management. It is obvious fiom the sequence of events that it was his
65. 649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
66. Id. at 265.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Chertkof v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1113, 1126 (1979), affd,649 F.2d 264
(4th Cir. 1981). The Tax Court distinguished Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.
554 (1974), on its facts. Chertkof, 72 T.C. at 1124.
72. Chertkof, 72 T.C. at 1126.
73. Chertkof v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 1981).
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personal expertise that was acquired by the maintenance
contract. . . .

...

It would take a simplistic view of the intrafamily business dealings reflected by the record to hold other than the
Tax Court held-that the maintenance contract was in reality
a contract between E & T and Taxpayer."

The Fourth Circuit did not specifically address the issue of
whether a former shareholder has a prohibited interest per se
when retained as an independent contractor. However, language in the opinion suggests that the Fourth Circuit accepts
the Tax Court's analysis in determining whether a shareholder
has a prohibited interest. That analysis requires a finding that
the redeemed shareholder maintains a financial or control
interest in the corporation:
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination
that the Taxpayer retained stock interest after the attempted
redemption because he did not comply with subsection (ii)
above in that through the maintenance contract between
Chertkof Co. and E & T, Taxpayer maintained a financial and
control interest in E & T. It is the correctness of this holding
that is in issue.75

After analyzing the facts, the Fourth Circuit concluded,
"The maintenance contract in effect gave complete control over
E & T to Taxpayer (who.had absolute control of Chertkof Co.),
and with it power to use E & T in many ways which could
In using this financial and control
inure to him finan~ially."~~
interest test, the Fourth Circuit indicated that it does not consider an independent contractor to hold a prohibited interest,
per se.
the Court of Appeals for the
In Lynch v. Cornrni~sioner,~~
Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result, holding that a taxpayer who provides services as an independent contractor to a
corporation after a complete redemption of stock has an interThe
est in the corporation prohibited by § 302(c)(2)(~)(i).~~
Ninth Circuit, in overruling a Tax Court decision that the re-

74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 801 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1986).
78. Id. at 1179.
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deemed shareholder did not have an interest in the corporation,
did not attempt to distinguish the facts involved in Lynch from
the facts present in Lennard. Rather, the court disagreed with
the rationale in Lennard and argued that any relationship with
the corporation, other than a creditor relationship, is a prohibited interest under § 302(~)(2)(~)(i).~'
The taxpayer in Lynch was the sole shareholder of a corporation involved in the leasing of cast-in-place concrete pipe mac h i n e ~ The
. ~ ~ taxpayer owned the machines individually, but
The taxpayer sold a small
leased them to his ~orporation.~'
amount of stock to his son and shortly thereafter the corporation redeemed his remaining stocksg2The taxpayer's son, seeking to retain his father's expertise in the specialized machinery,
entered into a consulting agreement on behalf of the corporat i ~ n The
. ~ ~
agreement between the taxpayer and the corporation provided for payments of $500 per month for five years,
plus reimbursement of all business related expenses.84In return the taxpayer agreed to render technical consulting services as the corporation might reasonably requestsg5In addition,
the taxpayer was covered by the corporation's group medical insurance policy and medical reimbursement plan.86
The Tax Court found that the services provided by the
taxpayer did not amount to a prohibited interest in the corporati~n.~
After
? determining that the taxpayer was an independent contractor rather than an employee, the Tax Court analyzed the facts and circumstances to determine whether the
taxpayer had a financial stake in the corporation or managerial
. ~ ~ the consulting agreement
control after the r e d e m ~ t i o n Since
was not linked to the future profitability of the corporation and
there was no evidence that the taxpayer exerted any control
over the corporation, the Tax Court determined that the taxpayer did not have an interest prohibited by § 302(c)(2)(A)(ihg9

79. Id. at 1181.
80. Id. at 1176-77.
81. Id. at 1177.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Lynch v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597, 610 (1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1176 (9th
Cir. 1986).
88. Id. at 606.
89. Id. at 608.
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's "individualized
determination of whether a taxpayer has retained a financial
stake or continued to control the corporati~n."~~
Citing language from 5 302's legislative history, the Ninth Circuit concluded that its holdingg1"comports with the plain language of
5 302 and its legislative history."92

B. The Tax Court Analysis is the Better Approach
Despite the assertion in Lynch that the plain meaning of
the statute and the legislative history demand that an independent contractor be treated as holding a prohibited interest in
the redeeming corporation, a more careful reading of the statute and its legislative history favor the analysis adopted by the
Tax Court in Lennard.
The relevant statutory language in $ 302 requires that the
family stock attribution rules be waived if, inter alia, "immediately after the distribution the distributee has no interest in
the corporation (including an interest as officer, director, or
employee), other than an interest as a redi it or."'^ In order to
avoid the application of the family attribution rules, the redeemed shareholder cannot have an "interest" in the corporation, other than as a creditor, following the redemption.
One of the basic rules of statutory construction is that a
term used in a statute is given its common meaning unless
circumstances indicate otherwise." Black's Law Dictionary
defines "interest" as "[tlhe most general term that can be employed to denote a right, claim, title, or legal share in something. . . . More particularly it means a right to have the advantage accruing fkom anything; any right in the nature of
property, but less than title."95Generally, an independent contractor cannot be said to have a right, claim, title, or legal
share in a corporation to which he or she provides services,
other than as a creditor for services already performed.
Notwithstanding the argument in Lynch that inquiring
into the facts and circumstances surrounding a consulting
agreement creates uncertainty in the application of $ 302,

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Lynch v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1986).
See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1182.
I.R.C. 9 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY
729 (5th ed. 1979).
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without examining the facts and circumstances it is impossible
to determine whether a redeemed shareholder has an interest
in the corporation. One must wonder why, if it is appropriate to
look a t the facts and circumstances to determine whether a
redeemed shareholder is a creditor or an owner:6 it is not appropriate to examine the facts and circumstances to determine
whether a shareholder, through a consulting agreement with
the corporation, has an interest in the corporation. Whether a
former shareholder is a creditor or an interest holder depends
on the definition of those terms under 5 302(c)(2)(A)(i),and an
examination of the facts is necessary to reach a conclusion. The
Ninth Circuit would have us believe that Congress intended to
make no distinction, in determining the tax treatment of a
redemption transaction, between a redeemed shareholder who
enters into a contract to remove snow fkom the company parking lot and a redeemed shareholder who enters into a contract
giving the redeemed shareholder complete authority to manage
the corporation's business activities. Interpreting the statute to
include any independent contractor as one holding an interest
in the corporation simply does not comply with the basic rule of
statutory construction ascribing the common meaning to terms
used in a statute.
According to the Ninth Circuit, "[tlhe parenthetical language in section 302(c)(Z)(A)(i)merely provides a subset of
prohibited interests from the universe of such interests, and in
no way limits us from finding that an independent contractor
retains a prohibited intere~t."~'The Ninth Circuit is correct.
However, the fact that Congress decided to make clear that an
officer, director, or employee could be treated as holding an
interest in the corporation does not mandate that all independent contractors be deemed to hold an interest in the corporation within the meaning of § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).Even though an
officer, director, or employee may not normally be considered to
hold a "right, claim, title or legal share" in his or her corporation, Congress determined that because of the potential for an
officer, director, or employee to control the corporation's operations, the statute should make clear that one in a position to
control the corporation has an interest in the corporation within the meaning of § 302(~)(2)(A)(i).'~
If we ascribe the common
96. See, e.g., Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 562 (1974); Dunn v.
Commissioner, 615 F.2d 578, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
97. Lynch v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1986).
98. H.R. REP. NO. 1337, supra note 9, at 36, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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meaning to the terrn "interest," it is more logical to conclude
that by the inclusion of officers, directors, and employees Congress was attempting to make clear that taxpayers in a position to control the operations of the corporation are treated as
holding an interest in the corporation. This interpretation of
the statute is supported by the policy underlying § 302(c)(2),
that taxpayers who, after a stock redemption transaction, continue to control the family-owned corporation or maintain a
financial stake in it should not obtain the benefit of sale
treatment on the redemption." It is this underlying policy
that requires an examination of the facts and circumstances to
determine whether a particular consulting agreement gives a
redeemed shareholder the ability to control the operations of
the corporation or to benefit financially in a manner similar to
a shareholder with an ownership interest.
The Ninth Circuit relies on legislative history to conclude
that examining the facts and circumstances surrounding a
consulting agreement creates uncertainty that Congress sought
to eliminate when it enacted 5 302.1WThe court's reliance on
the legislative history is misplaced.
The uncertainty that concerned Congress resulted from the
dividend equivalency test used by the courts prior to the enactment of § 302. Under the dividend equivalency test, payments
from a corporation that are not essentially equivalent to a
dividend are taxed as capital gains.''' The facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction are examined to determine
whether the distribution by the corporation is essentially equivalent to a dividend. The Ninth Circuit102 cited the following
language from the House Committee Report:
In lieu of a factual inquiry in every case, [§ 3021 is intended
to prescribe specific conditions from which the taxpayer may
ascertain whether a given redemption will be taxable at rates
applicable to the sale of assets or as a distribution of property
not in redemption of stock subject to section 301.1°3

at 4212-13; S. REP. NO. 1622, supra note 9, at 45, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4676.
99. S. REP. NO. 1622, supra note 9, at 45, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4676. Even the Ninth Circuit agrees that this is the policy underlying 302(c)(2).
See Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1181 n.7.
100. Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1179.
101. Bains v. United States, 289 F.2d 644, 647 (Ct. C1. 1961).
102. Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1179.
103. H.R. REP. NO. 1337, supra note 9, at 35, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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The factual inquiry referred to relates to the dividend
equivalency test, not whether a shareholder retains an interest
under 5 302(c)(2)(A),and the specific conditions referred to
relate to the redemption tests found in 5 302(b)(2), (b)(3), and
(b)(4).lo4The legislative history of 5 302(c)(2) contains no implication that a factual inquiry into whether a shareholder
retains an interest in the corporation is improper. The legislative history cited by the Ninth Circuit is inapposite.
The approach of the Tax Court, as set forth in Lewis,
Lennard, and Lynch, and the apparent approach of the Fourth
Circuit discussed in Chertkof support the policy underlying
5 302(c)(2). That policy is to allow sale or exchange treatment
on the redemption of a family-owned corporation's stock only
when the shareholder has retained no control or financial stake
in the corporation's affairs. The Tax Court's approach also
comports with the plain meaning of the statute. The statute
states that no interest, other than an interest as a creditor, can
be retained by a shareholder seeking to waive the family stock
attribution rule. The statute specifically includes employee,
officer, and director as relationships that can be seen as an
interest in the corporation. However, an independent contractor
is not specifically mentioned and the question becomes whether
an independent contractor has an interest in the corporation
within the meaning of 5 302(c)(2)(A).Based on the plain meaning of the term "interest," an independent contractor would
generally not be considered to have an interest in the corporation, except perhaps as a creditor for services rendered. However, if the facts and circumstances show that the shareholder,
through a consulting agreement, has retained control over the
corporation or a financial stake akin to ownership, the
shareholder's status as an independent contractor should be
treated as an interest in the corporation under 5 302(c)(2)(A).

at 4210.
104. In general, under [Q 302(b)] your committee intends to incorporate into
the bill existing law as to whether or not a reduction is essentially
equivalent to a dividend under section 115(g)(a) of the 1939 Code, and
in addition to provide three definite standards in order to provide certainty in specific instances.
S. REP.NO. 1622, supra note 9, at 233, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4870.
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C. Summary
A shareholder in a family-owned corporation should carefully plan for the redemption of his or her stock. Due to the
application of the family stock attribution rules in all but complete redemption transactions, it is only when all of his or her
stock is redeemed that the redeemed shareholder will obtain
capital gain treatment. Younger family members may want to
retain the redeemed shareholder's services as a consultant,
especially when the redeemed shareholder has some technical
expertise applicable to the corporation's business. Although the
case law is in conflict over the issue of whether a consulting
agreement, per se, constitutes an interest in a corporation, the
Service's view is that any such agreement between a redeemed
shareholder and his or her corporation is a prohibited interest
that prevents the redeemed shareholder from waiving the family attribution rules. Although the Tax Court and the Fourth
Circuit Court analyze the facts and circumstances to determine
whether a particular consulting agreement constitutes a prohibited interest, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the view of the
Service. The analysis adopted by the Tax Court and apparently
the Fourth Circuit is supported by the statutory language and
the policy underlying 5 302(c)(2). However, cautious taxpayers
who reside outside the Fourth Circuit may decide to avoid
postredemption consulting agreements. Other taxpayers need
to exercise care in drafting postredemption consulting agreements. An agreement providing the redeemed shareholder with
de facto control of the corporation's operations or a compensation formula tied to the success of the corporation's business
may be held to be an interest in the corporation and turn a
valid sale into a dividend.

A. The Problem of Subordinated Debt and the Waiver of
Family Stock Attribution
When a retiring shareholder enters into a redemption
agreement with his or her closely held family corporation, the
corporation may not have the necessary liquidity to pay the
purchase price in cash. Perhaps the retiring shareholder may
want to spread the gain to be recognized on the sale over a
period of years. Consequently, the retiring shareholder may
enter into a redemption agreement calling for an installment
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sale of his or her stock. The installment note may be a significant liability on the corporation's financial statements.
Younger family members may wish to expand the
corporation's business and need to finance the expansion with
corporate debt. Obtaining such financing may be difficult due
to the large installment note payable to the retired shareholder. The retiring shareholder may be willing to subordinate his
or her installment note in an effort to assist the corporation in
securing additional financing.
By subordinating the corporation's installment obligation
to the claims of other corporate creditors, the retiring shareholder may unwittingly put the characterization of his or her
stock redemption at risk since the Service views the subordination of an installment note received in a stock redemption as
creating a noncreditor "interest in the corporation" prohibited
by 5 302(c)(2)(A)(i)and (ii).lo5Having a noncreditor interest
in the corporation, the retiring shareholder cannot take advantage of the family stock attribution waiver. Without the attribution waiver, the redemption is taxed as a dividend distribution.lo6

B. Analysis of Authority
The position of the Service is expressed in Treasury Regulation 5 1.302-4(d),which states:
For the purpose of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i),a person will be
considered to be a creditor only if the rights of such person
with respect to the corporation are not greater or broader in
scope than necessary for the enforcement of his claim. Such
claim must not in any sense be proprietary and must not be
subordinate to the claims of general creditors. An obligation
in the form of a debt may thus constitute a proprietary interest. For example, if under the terms of the instrument the
corporation may discharge the principal amount of its obligation to a person by payments, the amount or certainty of
which are dependent upon the earnings of the corporation,
such a person is not a creditor of the c~rporation.'~'

105. Treas. Reg. 8 1.302-4(d)(as amended in 1978).
106. For the treatment of the receipt of an installment obligation in a transaction characterized as a dividend distribution, see Cox v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
1021 (1982). The value of the obligation is taxed in the year of receipt. Id. at
1028.
107. Treas. Reg. 8 1.3024d).
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The Service requires that taxpayers seeking a ruling regarding
the tax treatment of a proposed stock redemption under
8 302(b)(3) (complete termination) represent that any note
received by the taxpayer in connection with the redemption is
not subordinated to the claims of general creditors.108
The position of the Service, as expressed in the regulation
quoted above, makes it extremely difficult for a redeeming
shareholder to structure the installment note in a way that
would facilitate a corporation obtaining outside financing without raising the ire of the Service. Fortunately, case law is not
as inflexible as the Service in determining whether a redeemed
shareholder holds an interest only as a creditor under
§ 302(c)(2)(A).
In Lennard v. Commis~ioner,'~~
the Tax Court addressed
the issue of whether the taxpayer, after the redemption of all
his stock, retained a prohibited interest in the corporation
because the note issued to him in exchange for his stock was
subordinated to the corporation's other debts. The Tax Court
found that mere subordination did not make the taxpayer's
installment note a prohibited interest within the meaning of
9 302(c)(z)(~)(i).
'lo
According to the Tax Court, the Service's prohibition
against subordination arises only when other factors indicate
that a debt instrument may, in substance, constitute a proprietary interest.'" Rather than question the validity of Treasury Regulation 9 1.302-4(d),the Tax Court chose to interpret
the regulation as requiring more than debt subordination before a note will be treated as a prohibited interest under
§ 302(c)(2)(A).'12 The Tax Court concluded that the other
facts and circumstances in Lennard were indicative of a creditor interest so that the subordination of the note did not cause
the taxpayer's interest in the corporation to be anything other
than a creditor's interest.l13

108. Rev. Proc. 86-18,1986-1 C.B. 551, § 5.02.
109. 61 T.C. 554 (1974).
110. Id. at 563.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The Tax Court's interpretation of Treasury Regulation 8 1.302-4(d)is
peculiar when one considers that in Lennard the Service was litigating a case in
which the installment note had no indicia of ownership other than subordination.
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which also addressed the
In Dunn v. Comrni~sioner,~~~
subordination scenario, the taxpayer entered into a stock redemption agreement with her closely held family corporation.
The agreement provided that a portion of the purchase price
would be paid in installments. The corporation operated a
Chevrolet dealership and the terms of the franchise agreement
with General Motors required the corporation to "maintain a
certain 'Owned Net Working Capital' in order to retain the
dealership."l15 The installment sale agreement between the
taxpayer and the corporation provided that if the making of an
installment payment would cause the corporation to be in violation of the "owned net working capital" requirement and would
prevent the corporation from retaining 50% of its net after tax
profits, then the payment would be postponed until the payment would not result in a violation of the franchise requirement.l16
The Service argued that the taxpayer held an interest in
the corporation other than as a creditor due to the provision in
the installment agreement providing for postponement of payments, and cited its regulation defining a creditor interest in
the context of 5 302(c)(2)(A)in support of its position.l17 Thus,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a decision of the
Tax Court,l18 held that the installment sale agreement treated only a creditor interest, despite the payment restriction.llg
The Second Circuit found Treasury Regulation 5 1.302-4(d) to
be concerned with the redeeming shareholder's status as a
The
holder of a proprietary interest in the ~orporation.'~~
Treasury Regulation prohibits a redeeming shareholder from
retaining rights broader or greater than those of a creditor
(e.g., voting rights or rights to convert his or her claim into
stock).121The Treasury Regulation also prohibits a shareholder from retaining a proprietary interest by structuring the debt
to resemble an equity interest.122 According to the Second

615 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 580.
Id.
Id. at 582.
Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 715 (1978), affd, 615 F.2d 578 (2d Cir.

Dunn v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1980)
Id. at 582.
Treas. Reg. 3 1.302-4(d).
Id.
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Circuit, the prohibition in the regulation against subordinating
the redeeming shareholder's installment payment to the claims
of general creditors is an attempt to address the equity aspect
of a proprietary interest, not the nature of a subordinated interest .123
In addition to claiming that the taxpayer had a noncreditor
interest in the corporation, the Service argued that the terms of
the taxpayer's redemption agreement restricting the timing of
the corporation's payments amounted to debt subordinat i ~ n . 'In
~ ~response, the Second Circuit did not hold, as the
Tax Court concluded in Lennard, that mere subordination fails
to convert an otherwise valid debt into an equity interest under
5 302(~)(2)(A).'~~
Rather, the Court determined that the terms
of the redemption agreement did not amount to debt subordination:
Nothing in the agreement affects the rank of the taxpayer's
claim as against general creditors, and there is nothing in the
Agreement that, if [the corporation] had been put into liquidation, would have given any creditor a basis for arguing that
he should be paid before the taxpayer was paid.126

Finally, the Service argued that the taxpayer retained a
prohibited interest since, under Treasury Regulation 8 1.3024(d), a redeemed shareholder is not considered merely a creditor if "under the terms of the instrument the corporation may
discharge the principal amount of its obligation [to the redeemed shareholder] by payments, 'the amount or certainty of
which are dependent upon the earnings of the corporaThe
ti~n.'"'~
~ Court found that the restriction regarding payments on the installment note affected only the timing of the
payment and not the amount or certainty of payment so that
the regulation was inapplicable to the facts:
The regulation, then, does not support the
Commissioner's position, for the instrument under review
does not exhibit a single one of the characteristics given significance by the regulation. What is more important, the obligation here, to the extent that it differs from the classic debt

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Dunn, 615 F.2d at 582.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 110.
Dunn, 615 F.2d at 582-83.
Id. at 583.
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of fixed amount and inexorable due date, does not differ in
the direction of being a proprietary or equity type of interest,
but differs simply in being unmistakably debt, but of a seemingly somewhat inferior quality because of the postponement
clause.'21

The Second Circuit, having determined that the regulation
cited by the Service was inapplicable to the facts of the case,
turned its attention to the question of how to determine if a
instrument is debt or equity. Although dicta, language in Dunn
suggests that the Second Circuit agrees with the Tax Court
that mere subordination of a debt does not create an interest
other than the interest as a creditor.12'
In Duerr v. Commi~sioner,'~~
the taxpayer received bonds
in a redemption transaction treated by the taxpayer as a cornplete termination of interest under § 302(b)(3). Interest on the
bonds received was payable at a fixed rate, but payable out of
income only.13' No subrogation clause was included in the
sales agreement. The Tax Court observed that the terms of
payment on the bonds were, in substance, no different than the
terms of the preferred stock redeemed in the t r a n ~ a c t i 0 n . l ~ ~
The Tax Court found the bonds to be a prohibited interest,
resulting in dividend treatment on the amount received by the
taxpayer and originally treated as sales proceeds from the
redemption transaction. '33
A close reading of Lennard and Dunn reveals that neither
case actually rejects the Service's apparent position that a
redeeming shareholder who subordinates his or her installment
note to the claims of creditors has retained a prohibited interest under § 302(c)(2)(A).In Lennard, the Tax Court interpreted
Treasury Regulation 5 1.302-4(d) as requiring more than mere
subordination before a debt will be treated as a prohibited
interest.134In Dunn, the Second Circuit avoided confronting
the issue of whether mere subordination creates a prohibited
interest by finding that the terms of the redemption agreement
did not amount to debt s~bordination.'~~
However, the discusId.
See id. at 584.
30 T.C. 944 (1958).
Id. at 946.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 948.
See supra text accompanying note 110.
See supra text accompanying note 124.
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sion in each case regarding what constitutes debt and what
constitutes equity indicates that mere subordination of an installment note received in the complete redemption of a
shareholder's stock will not cause the redeemed shareholder to
be treated as retaining a prohibited interest.136
Lennard and Dunn appear to adopt, for purposes of
9 302(c)(2)(A), the analysis underlying 9 385 of the Code.137
Section 385 requires an examination of several factors to determine if an instrument is debt or equity.138This analysis is
consistent with the purpose underlying 5 302(c)(2)to allow sale
treatment to a bona fide redemption of stock from a shareholder of family-owned corporation where the shareholder has not
retained the incidents of shareholder status, namely, a proprietary interest in the corporation or the ability to control the
corporation's affairs. This approach to analyzing debt in the
context of redemption transactions involving family-owned
corporations is likewise reflected in Duerr, in which the payment to the shareholder, dependent on corporate earnings, was
akin to a proprietary interest.

C. Summary
A shareholder who receives an installment obligation and
agrees to subordinate the obligation to the claims of general
creditors risks a challenge fkom the Service. Although the cases
dealing with this issue have not specifically invalidated the
regulation relied on by the Service, they do indicate that mere
subordination of an installment note will not cause an otherwise valid stock redemption to be recast as a dividend distribution. Intrepid shareholders may choose to risk litigation with
the Service in an effort to assist the family-owned corporation
in obtaining outside financing. This may be a better alternative
than personally guaranteeing corporate debt.

VI. CONCLUSION
Achieving capital gain treatment is the tax objective of a
shareholder planning the redemption of stock by his or her
family-owned corporation. However, a shareholder may have
nontax objectives as well, such as continuing to provide impor-

136. Dunn, 615 F.2d at 584; Lennard, 61 T.C. at 563.
137. I.R.C.5 385 (1988).
138. Id. 5 38501).
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tant services to the corporation after the redemption, or accommodating the corporation's desire to obtain additional financing. Due to the possible application of the family stock attribution rules and consequent dividend treatment, taxpayers need
to recognize the potential pitfalls on the path to obtaining capital gain treatment.
A redeeming shareholder needs to address the problem
presented when a trust of which the shareholder is a beneficiary owns stock in the corporation, even if the shareholder's interest in the trust is remote and contingent. Unless the trust
allows for the distribution of the stock to trust beneficiaries the
redeeming shareholder may be put to a hard choice among
remaining a shareholder, paying tax at ordinary income rates
on the amount distributed by the corporation in exchange for
the shareholder's stock, and renouncing his or her interest in
the trust in order to obtain capital gain treatment.
Providing postredemption consulting services to the redeeming corporation can create problems for a redeeming
shareholder as well. The Service and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals hold that any agreement to provide postredemption
consulting services creates a prohibited interest that causes a
redemption to be treated as a dividend. The Tax Court holds
that not all postredemption services taint an otherwise valid
sale transaction. Only when the terms of the consulting agreement give the former shareholder a financial stake in the corporation or control over its operations will the Tax Court recast
a redemption as a dividend distribution. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals appears to agree with the Tax Court. Shareholders who provide postredemption services to the familyowned corporation risk litigation. If the nature of their consulting agreement gives the shareholder control over the
corporation's affairs or if the payments to be made to the shareholder are tied to the success of the corporation, the redemption will be treated as a dividend distribution.
Finally, subordinating an installment note received by the
retiring shareholder may cause the redemption to be challenged by the Service. Although case law appears to reject the
Service's position that mere subordination of an installment
note to the claims of general creditors is fatal to sale treatment, taxpayers need to be cautious in drafting the subordination agreement to avoid other indicia of equity ownership that
might suggest that the shareholder has more than a creditor's
interest in the redeeming corporation.
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A family-owned corporation presents unique planning problems for the redeeming shareholder. Avoiding the obstacles
discussed above may be difficult, but taxpayers need to recognize that failing to adequately plan the redemption transaction
can be financially devastating. A shareholder who thought he
or she completed a valid stock redemption may discover that
the transaction will be taxed as a dividend.

